Tindall and Another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33: Public authority liability and ‘making matters worse’

Introduction

On 23^rd October 2024, the Supreme Court handed down judgment in Tindall and Another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33 which concerned the scope of duty owed by public authorities, in this instance the Police, in the course of undertaking their operational duties. The case explored the distinction between failing to protect a person from harm, for which no duty generally arises, and causing harm (or ‘making matters worse’), from which negligence may arise.

The Facts

The key facts of the case are as follows.

In the early hours of 4^th March 2014, a driver, Mr. Kendall, skidded on a patch of black ice on the A413 Southbound, finding himself in a roadside ditch. With no serious injuries, and having identified the dangerous state of the road, Mr. Kendall exited his vehicle and tried to warn other road users about the ice by waving his arms around. He also called Thames Valley Police, the Defendant, via 111, whose officers attended the scene approximately thirty minutes later. Having given his account to attending officers, Mr. Kendall was placed in the care of the ambulance service and left the scene in said ambulance.

Whilst present at the scene, attending officers placed a singular “police slow” road sign on the Northbound carriageway, removed any accident debris from the road, and called the Defendant’s control request centre to request the attendance of a gritter (albeit without conveying any particular urgency). After Mr. Kendall had departed the scene, attending officers also left, removing the “police slow” sign they had placed on arrival.

Within thirty minutes of the officer’s departure, another driver, Mr. Bird, was travelling Northbound on the A413. He too lost control of his vehicle on the same patch of black ice, albeit around 184 metres from where Mr. Kendall’s car had landed in the ditch. Mr. Bird’s car traversed into the path of a car being driven in the opposite direction by Mr. Tindall, and a head-on collision ensued. Tragically, both drivers died at the point of impact or shortly thereafter.

 

The Appeal

The question before the Supreme Court was whether, having responded to the initial accident, the Police owed a duty of care to subsequent road users who encountered that same area of black ice.

The Appellant argued that they did; prior to their arrival at the scene, Mr. Kendall had been attempting to warn other drivers. It was contended that had the Police not attended, he would have continued with his attempts, but given their presence, he left. This was the mechanism by which the Police were said to have ‘made matters worse’.

There was a secondary argument to the effect that, even if the Police had not ‘made matters worse’, they were under a duty of care to protect road users from the danger caused by the black ice, having taken control of the scene.

 

The Findings

The Appeal failed; the Supreme Court determined that no duty was owed to Mr. Tindall, the Claimant’s husband, and therefore the claim on behalf of his dependants was struck out. The following findings were made:

• The ‘interference principle’ advanced by McBride and Bagshaw is a correct statement of English Law, and OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1997] 3 All ER 897 was incorrectly decided. The interference principle is simply one instance of ‘making matters worse’, whereby A has done something which prevents another from protecting B from a source of danger [56].

 

• The interference principle could apply regardless of whether the Police had ordered or encouraged Mr. Kendall to leave the scene; it was sufficient that they had attended, giving Mr. Kendall the impression that they would handle the situation, such that he decided to depart of his own accord [60].

 

• The attendance of Police did cause Mr. Kendall to cease attempts he would otherwise have made to warn other road users of the black ice [60] (the facts as pleaded were taken at their highest for the purposes of the strike-out application).

 

• However, for a duty of care to arise, it was not sufficient to show that the Police, by attending the scene, had prevented Mr. Kendall from helping other drivers, namely Mr. Tindall. Instead, it needed to be shown that the Police knew, or ought to have known, that their conduct would have that effect [58].

 

• It was not a pleaded allegation that the attending officers were, or should have been, aware of Mr. Kendall having tried to alert other motorists prior to their arrival, and nor was there any evidence to make such an inference: “as far as the police were concerned, Mr Kendall was someone who had been injured in an accident and no more than that. He was a victim, not a rescuer” [62]. The Police could therefore not be deemed to have ‘made matters worse’ by reason of the interference principle.

 

• As to whether the Police had assumed control of the accident scene, and therefore assumed a duty of care to protect motorists from the danger posed by the black ice, it was deemed that they had not, given that there was some 184 metres between where Mr. Kendall’s car was, and the latter collision involving Mr. Tindall. The ‘scene’ they allegedly assumed control of was therefore some distance from the fatal collision. In any event, the Police having taken ineffectual steps to intervene, did not give rise to a duty of care [84].

 

Comment

This case was the latest in a series to come before the Supreme Court, concerning the distinction in law between a public authority having failed to protect a person from harm and actively ‘making matters worse’. The unanimous judgment provides a clear and helpful summary of the authorities to date. It is proffered that the law in this area is now settled, and no longer in a state of flux [68]. There are, of course, public policy considerations for keeping the scope of duty tight.

However, having declared the interference principle good law, the Supreme Court has somewhat broadened the scope for a duty to arise in rescue scenarios, albeit the same was not established on this particular set of facts. The Police and other public authorities will need to think carefully about their role when attending accident and emergency situations, how they effectuate their response, and how they interact and communicate with others at the scene. Where on-scene rescuers are displaced, be those rescuers lay-people or other public authorities, and further harm ensues, there is the potential for liability to arise.

The interference principle failed in this particular case for lack of evidence that the Police had either actual or constructive knowledge that Mr. Kendall would continue his attempts to warn others had they not attended the scene. This will be an important practical consideration for claimants at the early stages of litigation going forwards, who will be exposed to the risk of strike-out if such evidence is missing.

Earlier this month, the Court of Appeal handed down combined judgment in Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police v Woodcock and CJ and others v Chief Constable of Wiltshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 13, the first Court of Appeal judgment to consider and apply the principles in Tindall and Another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33 to two different factual scenarios. Michael Williams, Pupil Barrister at Farrar’s Building, provides an analysis here.

 

Analysis and review produced by Alicia Harrison who is a Probationary Tenant at Farrar’s Building. Alicia accepts instructions in all of Chambers’ practice areas.  For further information, please contact her Clerking Team.

 

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